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It is commonly argued that a serious right to life is grounded only in actual,
relatively advanced psychological capacities a being has acquired. The moral
permissibility of abortion is frequently argued for on these grounds. Increas-
ingly it is being argued that such accounts also entail the permissibility of
infanticide, with several proponents of these theories accepting this conse-
quence. We show, however, that these accounts imply the permissibility of
even more unpalatable acts than infanticide performed on infants: organ har-
vesting, live experimentation, sexual interference, and discriminatory killing.
The stronger intuitions against the permissibility of these ‘pre-personal acts’
allow us to re-establish a comprehensive and persuasive reductio against
psychological accounts of persons.
keywords infanticide, persons, personhood, pre-personal acts, sex, harm,
abortion, consent
Introduction
Advocates of the moral permissibility of abortion often base their views on a con-
ception of rights or interests which apply only to a specific subset of human
beings – usually termed ‘persons’ – where one is a person only if one satisfies
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certain psychological, cognitive, or other requirements. Although this is not the only
way of generating the conclusion that abortion is permissible – others appeal to
maternal bodily autonomy or similar considerations independent of the value or
rights of the foetus – it is one of the more common and persuasive.1 Since foetuses
lack the relevant psychological apparatus or features (either in kind or degree), they
lack certain rights or interests that adult humans ordinarily have, including the right
to life.2 It is often held, by extension, that these considerations likewise justify early
infanticide in some or all circumstances, since there is no relevant disparity between
the capacities or abilities of, for example, late-stage foetuses and infants. On this
account, therefore, infants also lack the serious right to life which we typically pre-
dicate of adult humans.
The conclusion that infanticide is permissible was once widely considered a con-
vincing reductio ad absurdum of psychological accounts of persons, rights or inter-
ests.3 Given the growing acceptance of the permissibility of infanticide, whether for
severely disabled infants or more broadly,4 this has gradually ceased to be the case.
But if infanticide is no longer too big a bullet to bite, there remain bigger ones. It is
therefore worth exploring other implications of psychological accounts, many of
which receive no such analogical support.5 In doing so, we attempt to re-establish
a persuasive reductio. Given psychological accounts, we argue, it follows, first,
that infanticide is permissible for healthy infants. Secondly, infants can be harvested
for organ transplants (or, perhaps, for more trivial reasons). Thirdly, infants can be
subject to live, invasive experimentation. Fourthly, infants can be used for sexual
gratification. Finally, infants can be actively discriminated against on the basis of
what are generally accepted protected characteristics for mature humans.
Psychology and personhood
Let us consider more closely how and which psychological capacities are supposed
to generate a serious right to life. According to defenders of psychological accounts,
psychological capacities and abilities are thought to confer moral value, often by
generating intermediary ethical currency which may depend on such capacities –
desires and interests, for example. In a variety of ways, these impose normative
1We note that several of our interlocutors here have objected to the autonomy-based arguments for the permissibility of
abortion.
2We do not hereby imply that a ‘right to life’ is indefeasible – only that the extent to which a human life is morally or
legally protected, according to the authors in question, is a function of these psychological capacities. For those undis-
posed towards ‘rights’, our argument can be adapted, mutatis mutandis, for various accounts of the wrongness of
murder.
3 It is possible that a psychological account of rights is true while a psychological account of personhood is false – if per-
sonhood and rights come apart, for example. For ease of discussion, however, we stipulate that ‘person’ means some-
thing like ‘bearer of the serious rights we normally accord to adult humans’. So we leave open the possibility of, for
example, entirely unconscious beings being ‘persons’, laying aside the Lockean tradition of taking ‘person’ to verbally
imply certain conscious traits. When we refer to ‘psychological accounts’, therefore, we are referring to both psychologi-
cal accounts of personhood and psychological accounts of value and rights, since ‘personhood’ in our essay just is the
status of having those rights. e.g. Sumner 1981.
4 Some contemporary examples of arguments in support of some form of infanticide include: Hassoun and Kriegel 2008;
McMahan 2013; Räsänen 2016; Schuklenk 2015.
5 As, for example, the palatability of infanticide has been strengthened by its link with euthanasia in cases of severe
disability.
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obligations upon others within the community of persons – what McMahan (2003)
calls the ‘morality of respect’. One such obligation has been characterised as the
‘right to life’. For clarity, we take ‘x has a right to life’ to mean that other humans
ordinarily have an obligation to refrain from killing x (excepting perhaps cases of
self-defence, and so on).6
Philosophers have therefore frequently sought to establish those properties of
objects or agents which constitute or indicate personhood, or which otherwise estab-
lish a right to life. We do not seek to delineate the precise relationship between
psychological capacities and rights here, nor do we hasten to establish a comprehen-
sive account of these rights and their theoretical underpinnings. Rather, we will
briefly outline the theoretical background of the main defences of infanticide,
before arguing that the same accounts which permit infanticide fail equally to pro-
hibit considerably more unpalatable actions.
Such accounts normally include reference to certain conscious capacities.7 Tooley’s
initial work, for example, suggested the following account: ‘An organism possesses a
serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of
experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing
entity’ (1972, p. 44). Since rights are based on desires, and desires of necessity require
conceptual (though not necessarily linguistic) understanding of the desired state of
affairs, the desire to continue existing requires the concept of a continuing self, and so
beings lacking such a concept cannot have the desire (and hence nor the right) to live.
Along similar lines, Joel Feinberg (1974) argues that to have rights, an entity must
have interests, which are composed in some way of conations such as wishes, desires
and hopes. Although he ultimately concludes that infanticide is normally wrong for
pragmatic reasons, he indicates that it is not intrinsically wrong in virtue of killing a
person. Tooley (1988, p. 87) later adopted the notion of interests in a slight modifi-
cation of his view: ‘a thing’s interest is a function of its present and future desires’.
Foetuses and newborns are not included, however, because there is no person
who persists from infancy to adulthood, and so they do not have future desires.
And so the conclusion remains broadly the same.
One widely suggested psychological criterion is self-awareness. Self-awareness in
young children has historically been measured by the mirror self-recognition (MSR)
test (Rochat and Zahavi 2011). However, children do not commonly pass the MSR
test until between 18 and 24 months of age (Broesch et al. 2011) and the exact
meaning of the test is still disputed8. Furthermore some psychologists have presented
various stages of self-awareness that do not culminate in children until 5-years of age
(Rochat 2003); under some psychological accounts this would significantly increase
the threshold for possessing a right to life. In addition, children do not perceive them-
selves as an enduring self across both time and space until they are 3–4 years of age
6 It is plausible that this right entails not only negative duties as mentioned here but also positive duties: so, for example,
many think it plausible that societies have an obligation to protect and preserve life through healthcare, etc.
7 David Boonin (2003) requires ‘organized cortical brain activity’, which is detectable by the 25th week of gestation, for
the right to life. As this is not strictly a psychological account, we will not discuss his views further here.
8 One reason for this is the significant cross-cultural variation that has been demonstrated in the MSR test pass rates,
which may undermine its use as a reliable universal measure of self-awareness. In one cross-cultural study looking at
18- to 20-month-olds, over 50% of German, Greek and Costa Rican children passed the MSR test, compared with
4% of Cameroonian children.
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(Rochat 2003); this has serious implications for psychological accounts of persons
which rely on a particular kind of self-awareness. Given the length of time it takes
for self-awareness to unfold in children, Giubilini and Minerva’s (2013) case for neo-
naticide or ‘post-birth abortion’ is actually very conservative. Of course, other psycho-
logical criteria will not be so restrictive – we note here only that accounts need to be
very carefully drawn even to include young children in the morality of respect.
Kuhse and Singer (1985, p. 120) cite Joseph Fletcher’s requirements of ‘self-
awareness, self-control, a sense of the future, a sense of the past, the capacity to
relate to others, concern for others, communication, and curiosity’, while Singer
(2011) elsewhere refers to the simple Lockean themes of rationality and self-
consciousness. Mary Anne Warren’s (1973) classic article outlines five criteria, includ-
ing ‘the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness’. More recently, Giubilini and
Minerva (2013, p. 262) state that a person is an ‘individual who is capable of attribut-
ing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of this
existence represents a loss to her’. It is unclear exactly what this means or how it
could be measured, but it seems to require the capacity for self-awareness. Elsewhere,
they suggest that infants can be harmed by killing insofar as they have ‘aims’. Again,
how rudimentary these may be (or in fact are) is not specified.
Finally, McMahan (2003) makes explicit a two-tiered account9 in which only
beings with psychological capacities or properties above a certain threshold are
granted full moral status and are subject to the ‘morality of respect’. According to
this account, the killing of any such being is equally wrong, ceteris paribus. McMa-
han’s account of this threshold makes no detailed claim about where the threshold
lies: we do not know what constitutes the threshold, he suggests, but given that
animals fall below it, and given that it is based on psychological capacities, foetuses
and infants must also fall below it.
Below this threshold of respect, killing is not as serious as the killing of an adult
person, as the object/agent does not have equal moral status. Although killing is still
a harm, it is not a harm that applies equally: rather, it is governed by McMahan’s
time-relative interest account (TRIA), where S’s interests are a function of the
good contained within S’s future if S does not die, and the strength of the psychologi-
cal connections between S and S’s future self.
Pre-personal humans and pre-personal acts
According to these accounts, not all human beings are persons. There is a threshold
(usually taken to be a complex of psychological properties and capacities) that must
be attained for a human to be regarded as a person and to gain the rights most adult
humans have. Although foetuses, newborns and infants may have some rights in
virtue of their limited psychological capacities, they come nowhere near to having
a serious right to life. And, in particular, the rights they do have are typically over-
ridable by the rights or interests of actual persons.
9 This is implicit in other accounts too, e.g. where authors say that infants have no right to life but still have a right not to
have pain inflicted on them. But McMahan’s is seemingly distinctive in that he appears to attribute some value to the
infant’s life, rather than just granting it the right not to have pain inflicted.
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Warren (1973), for example, allows that a potential person may still possess some
right to life, but states that this can never outweigh the rights of an actual person, in
particular the mother, who has a right to protect her ‘health, happiness, freedom and
even her life’. That is, a person’s rights should always outweigh the rights of a non-
person. Similarly, Giubilini and Minerva (2013, p. 263) state that ‘the interests of
actual people over-ride the interest of merely potential people to become actual
ones’. They do note that non-persons have a right not to have unnecessary pain
inflicted upon them, just as it is generally accepted amongst utilitarians that pain
should not be gratuitously inflicted on any sentient creature.
Let us call human beings who have not yet met the criteria for personhood pre-
personal humans. More precisely for our purposes, a pre-personal human is any
human who has not yet attained the capacities or other features sufficient for
inclusion within the community of full rights-bearers. We also define pre-personal
acts: acts performed on or with a pre-personal human. It is to these we now turn.
The permissibility of infanticide
The first implication normally drawn from psychological criteria for personhood is
the relative permissibility of abortion at any stage of pregnancy. Foetuses, even at the
later stages of pregnancy, are not (according to some accounts) self-aware or
rational, and lack the concept of a continuing self, even though they may be mini-
mally conscious (Lagercrantz and Changeux 2009); they are, therefore, not
persons. Consequently, they do not have a right to life.
It is important to note that under McMahan’s TRIA, a foetus that is conscious
does have an interest in living, albeit a weak interest because of its minimal psycho-
logical continuity with its future self, despite significant possible good in its future.
But it does have an interest, which is why McMahan considers late-term abortions
morally different to early-term abortions. However, its weak time-relative interests
cannot prevail against the much stronger time-relative interests of existing persons
such as parents, and since it has no right to life, McMahan regards late-term abor-
tions as still permissible.
Infants are little different to conscious foetuses psychologically, and so according
to typical psychological accounts of personhood, value and rights, they also lack a
right to life. Again, their weak psychological continuity with their future selves
means they have a similarly weak time-relative interest in living. The natural impli-
cation is that infanticide is at least sometimes permissible, and typically, ethicists
who hold to psychological accounts agree that this is true for cases of severely dis-
abled infants whose quality of life is likely to be poor.
As several defenders of infanticide point out, however, these considerations actu-
ally imply the permissibility of infanticide in a much wider variety of cases –most of
the aforementioned authors do not make room in their accounts for any rights for
foetuses and infants (excepting perhaps the right not to be subject to pain), while
the other accounts suggest that in view of their minimal psychological capacities,
their rights are present but easily overridable and, in McMahan’s (2003, p. 339)
words, ‘may permissibly be weighed and traded off against the time-relative interests
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of others in the manner approved by consequentialists’. If this is correct, of course, it
is plausible that infanticide is sometimes obligatory.
While some defenders of infanticide have focused on cases of severe disability, there-
fore, this focus has only pragmatic grounding. If the rights of infants are overridable
by the rights of actual persons, there is no reason why healthy infants should be
immune from the utilitarian calculus: if the interests of adults can be furthered suffi-
ciently by killing the infant, there is no theoretical ground for opposing such killing.
And even those who offer pragmatic reasons for limiting infanticide do not deny
that there could be fairly simple goods outweighing these practical considerations.
Ethicists are increasingly advocating more liberal approaches to infanticide.
McMahan acknowledges the problem, concluding that his views entail that
orphaned infants could be (and, perhaps, ought to be) utilised for organ transplants
to save other children. According to McMahan (2003, p. 360), ‘most people will
find this implication intolerable’, and he freely confesses ‘that I cannot embrace it
without significant misgivings and considerable unease’. Despite his unease,
however, McMahan (2003, p. 361) feels he is inexorably forced into accepting
that newborns must be ‘in principle, sacrificable’.
Giubilini and Minerva (2013, p. 262), likewise, have recently referred to infanti-
cide as after-birth abortion to emphasise their view that it is morally equivalent to
abortion: ‘we claim that killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the
circumstances where abortion would be’. Giubilini and Minerva suggest that this
might be the case for at least a few weeks after birth. While they give no detailed
exposition of when abortion is acceptable, it includes circumstances where the
infant will have an (at least) acceptable life, but the well-being of the family is at
risk. One suspects, of course, that for many people the circumstances in which abor-
tion is thought to be acceptable are considerably wider.
It seems clear that despite the intention on the part of some to limit infanticide to
severely disabled infants, other ethicists are not so reticent to embrace the conse-
quences of these psychological accounts in endorsing the killing of healthy
infants. For those who hold to a form of consequentialism (and for those who
hold to consequentialism below the ‘threshold of respect’), it is not difficult to
find reasons why existing persons will benefit from ending the life of healthy
infants. If parents decide that their child is not wanted after birth due to financial
and emotional constraints, this may be regarded as sufficient reason.
The implication that infanticide of healthy infants is permissible in certain scen-
arios under psychological accounts is for many, perhaps most, a conclusion to be
avoided. But while some have been happy to bite the bullet on infanticide, there
remain other, less widely discussed implications of these accounts. Our moral sensi-
bilities may have been chastened by the increasing acceptance of the permissibility of
infanticide. But, we suggest, they are likely to remain sensitive to more unpalatable
pre-personal acts, which we now consider.
Pre-personal use of infant’s organs for actual human persons
Involuntary organ donation is one possibility, mentioned by Kaczor (2014) as an
implication of McMahan’s views. There is a critical shortage of organ donors
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worldwide, and if pre-personal humans that are unwanted by parents or relatives
could help meet this need, there may be a moral obligation to use them thus. In
the UK alone there are approximately 6,500 people waiting on the national trans-
plant waiting list, 400 of whom die every year before they never receive an organ
donation (O’Carroll et al. 2017).
Indeed, we’ve noted that McMahan (2003) concludes it is morally permissible
(and perhaps obligatory) for orphaned newborns to be used for organ transplants.
Elsewhere (2007), he states that they ‘fall outside the scope of the constraint against
harmful using’. And while he does not comment explicitly on non-orphaned new-
borns, it seems that his view should hold for all newborns. If parents have
decided that their newborn is unwanted (for example, because it is disabled in
some way, or they have financial constraints, or perhaps even much more trivial
reasons) and the rights of the child are dependent only on their overridable, weak
time-relative interests, it is a short step to thinking that their organs could be used
for the benefit of existing persons rather than be discarded. Knowing that their
child is preserving the life of another child who is likely to have a better quality of
life could be of considerable comfort to parents in this situation. Moreover, it is dif-
ficult to see how there could be any strong argument against even the commerciali-
sation of this practice. And of course, they could even use their child’s organs to
prolong their own life or that of the child’s sibling. Given their connection to the
child, this is an even stronger case than for providing organs to anonymous recipi-
ents. While Singer argues strongly against organ harvesting from infants, citing the
attitude of care and protection of infants that he considers rules out the practice,10 it
will seem to many people that this does not generate the principled restriction on
organ harvesting which sits more comfortably with their intuitions. In any case, if
that requirement were very stringent, it is not clear why infanticide of disabled
infants – or abortion itself – would be permissible, since these also very plausibly
run counter to our basic attitude of care and protection towards infants.
If psychological accounts are correct and infants are not persons, there may even
be a moral obligation to utilise available organs to maximise benefit to existing
persons. Non-consensual organ harvesting, while desirable because of the obvious
benefits to those in need of organs, is constrained by our obligation to respect sur-
viving interests of the dead such as the previously expressed desire for bodily integ-
rity after death. There are no such surviving interests for infants – their weak
time-relative interests cannot survive their death. Discarding their organs appears
to be unjustifiable, given the great goods that would accrue to actual persons
from their use.11
10 Singer andWells think that this attitude is important ‘for the sake of the welfare of all our children’ (1984, p. 149). But
if he thinks we should all accept his arguments that infants and children are fundamentally different entities with differ-
ent rights then, were we to do so, having an opportunistic attitude towards infants would be entirely consonant with
having a protective attitude towards more mature children. In that case, there would be no obstacle to organ harvesting
from infants.
11 It is at least worth considering whether more trivial benefits for actual persons might equally justify this practice. After
all, if the deontic constraints on killing humans are absent for infants, and if they are sufficiently anaesthetised (for
example), it becomes difficult to explain why only the great benefit of saving lives via organ transplants would justify
the practice – why not more trivial benefits, like purely hedonic ones?
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It may also be permissible for infants to be deliberately conceived or created to
alleviate the shortage of human organs. Hypothetically, it may eventually be feasible
to prevent brain development and thus the development of self-awareness. We could
keep infants permanently unconscious, so that they never have the opportunity to
become persons, a scenario suggested by Peter Singer and Deanne Wells (1984).
Similarly, Carol Kahn has suggested ‘body clones’ – brainless bodies cultivated for
rejection-free body parts (Kahn 1989), as has McMahan (2003). These ‘baby-
farming’ scenarios would allow the development of more mature organs over a
period of months or even years.
Pre-personal use of infants for medical research
There are similar pre-personal acts which could benefit actual persons. Foetal tissue
from aborted foetuses has for many years been used in medical research, in areas as
diverse as HIV/AIDS, developmental biology, eye development and diseases, infec-
tious diseases, vaccines, and transplantation. According to bioethicist R. Alta
Charo (2015), nearly everyone in the United States (US) has benefited in some
respect from research using foetal tissue. But with similar justification, tissue
obtained from infants whose lives have been ended by infanticide could also be used.
The use of euthanised infants’ organs and tissues in this way is not the only possi-
bility. Of necessity, much medical research is conducted on living beings, including
human beings who volunteer themselves and animals who do not volunteer. If infan-
ticide is permissible (which, we recall, follows relatively naturally from these psycho-
logical accounts of rights), it seems that using infants for medical research prior to
being euthanised (or even without being euthanised) would also be permissible, pro-
vided sufficient benefits to actual persons accrue. It would be necessary to ensure
that the research does not cause pain, but this is compatible with relatively
extreme actions as long as appropriate safeguards are in place (e.g. a requirement
for sufficient analgesia). It might even be that a degree (perhaps a large degree) of
pain is morally acceptable, provided it is not gratuitous, and provided the benefits
are sufficiently large. It is also possible that this could be a commercial transaction.
Peter Singer notes this possibility when addressing animal experimentation. As a
utilitarian, he acknowledges that if the benefits (for animals or humans) are substan-
tial and could be obtained by sufficiently small suffering to animals, animal exper-
imentation may be morally acceptable. He challenges those in favour of doing so
to likewise be willing to experiment on ‘orphaned humans with severe and irrevers-
ible brain damage’ (Singer, 2011, p. 57), given their very limited cognitive capacities.
But it is a small step to suggest experimenting on infants with similar cognitive limit-
ations, given the massive potential benefits for actual persons. The implication that
infants could permissibly be used for live invasive experimentation will be a deeply
uncomfortable one for many people.
Pre-personal use of infants for sexual gratification
One of the most unpalatable pre-personal acts is the use of pre-personal humans for
sexual gratification. Provided that such acts do not result in physical damage or pain,
such acts could be permitted on any human that is yet to reach the threshold of
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personhood, including those that will become persons in the future. Given their very
weak psychological connection to that future person, in this scenario it seems that
little to no harm has been done to any person. Of course, if the infant is subsequently
killed, harm that would manifest in the future may not even be relevant. Conse-
quently, the hedonic benefit to existing persons does not need to be overwhelmingly
great to override the interests of the pre-personal human. In any case, since there is no
principled objection to using infants in this way according to the morality of respect,
all that is necessary to justify it is sufficient gratification for the actor. Effectively, this
could legitimise sexual abuse of very young children, whether it be parents abusing
their own children, or other persons doing so with the parents’ consent. Again, as
with organ harvesting and experimentation, this could even be commercialised.
We can get a tighter grip on this by considering non-consensual sex with animals.
Although for most of us bestiality elicits revulsion, many find it difficult to explain
why it is morally wrong provided the animal is not harmed. Of course, animals
cannot give informed consent, but there are circumstances where animals seem to
participate willingly. Peter Singer, for example, has concluded that it is ‘not wrong
inherently in a moral sense’ (Olasky, 2004), even if the animal qualifies as a
person according to his psychological criteria. If we are to ground the common intui-
tion that having sexual relations with infants is wrong, we will need an explanation
of why infants have a non-negotiable right to sexual integrity but animals do not,
without relying on species exceptionalism.12
On the psychological accounts of rights in question, it is difficult to give such an
explanation. While we do not have the space to exhaust possible explanations here,
we can use two recent accounts of the wrongness of rape to illustrate the difficulty
here. Archard’s (2007) careful account follows Feinberg initially in taking ‘harm’ to
mean a ‘setback to another’s interests’. We can see already that those accounts which
deny the foetus interests (in virtue of not being a continuing self) or which give the
foetus at best weak, overridable interests are going to have difficulty locating the
particular heinousness of rape of infants in the harm it causes to the infant.
On Archard’s account, rape is wrong since sexual integrity is a central concern or
interest of a person and of one’s identity – ‘our sexuality is an interest which defines
who and what each of us is’. He continues, ‘The more central interests are to person-
hood, the greater the harm, and hence moral injury, done to someone in overriding
her consent in relation to the interests. So if sex is central to personhood, [non-
consensual sex] assaults the very ‘core’ of the self and causes great moral injury’
(Archard, 2007, p. 390).
But if infants are not persons in any relevant sense, and if they are not part of the
‘morality of respect’ in virtue of being ‘one of us’, it is difficult to see how rape could
constitute such an assault on them. And it is especially difficult to see, if infants are
not ‘one of us’ in a way that accords them broadly the same rights as us, why we
should attribute to them the same interest in sexual integrity which we have. For
those who oppose abortion and infanticide, one way to attribute the same interest
12 It is possible that one might deny, pace Singer, the permissibility of bestiality (as the authors do). But in that case we
will need an explanation for both the wrongness of bestiality (with animals of similar cognitive capacity as infants) and
the wrongness of using infants for sexual gratification.
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here is in claiming an identity relation between foetuses, infants and adults, and to
suggest that identity relations are sufficient (though not necessary) to preserve inter-
ests and rights.13 But to posit a relation that preserves interests without preserving
rights seems entirely ad hoc. Yet that is the sort of move a defender of infanticide
must make to defend an infant’s right to sexual integrity in the sort of framework
Archard suggests.14
Berkich (2009, p. 397) helpfully surveys a broad range of views concerning what
makes rape so repugnant, eventually concluding: ‘I submit that rape is heinous
because it involves the sexual appropriation of a person, where rape sexually appro-
priates a person in Frankfurt’s sense by contravening an important class of the
second-order desires which constitute the person’.
‘The appropriation of a person for personal use’ is taken by Berkich (2009, p. 391)
to be part of what makes rape so heinous. But he notes that certain kinds of heinous
act can be more heinous than others. In the case of rape, following Archard, he notes
that rape is particularly heinous in virtue of its attacking a domain central to person-
hood. But he goes further: drawing on Frankfurt’s work on personhood and love,
Berkich draws attention to one particularly important feature of persons, namely,
their capacity for second-order desires. Rape attacks our second-order desires in
at least two ways. Firstly, it attacks our second-order desires about sex itself: so,
for example, date-rape still constitutes rape despite the first-order desire for sex
potentially being present. Secondly, love itself is best characterised as caring for
the beloved, where caring involves second-order desires, e.g. by setting aside our
own desires to care for our beloved, or by deliberately shaping our own desires
and wills in order to desire and will what is best for our beloved: ‘sex between
lovers reflects the rich and complicated reflective or second-order desires we have
regarding the affections we have towards ourselves and others’ (2009, p. 395).
Since rape attacks our personhood so centrally, by attacking our second-order
desires in such personal and important domains, it ‘reaches through the will to dom-
inate the person herself in a way mere assault does not’ (2009, p. 396).
Again, however, it is difficult to see how this account could explain the heinousness
of sexual relations with infants if a psychological account of rights is granted. For the
account essentially followsArchard in suggesting that rape violates something central
to personhood. And the modifications Berkich makes do not help here. If infants are
not persons, and if they can be dealt with ‘in the manner approved by consequential-
ists’, it is unclearwhy they should not be appropriated for personal use. And it is not at
all plausible that infants are sufficiently attuned to second-order desires of love and
sex for this to provide separate reason against violating them thus.15 So if infants –
like animals – are excluded from themoral community of persons, it becomes difficult
to explain why they may not be used opportunistically – occasionally even sexually.
13 This is not the only way, of course.
14 Archard does mention that one need not consider sex to be central to one’s personhood or to be highly sexually motiv-
ated for sex to be a central interest of ours. We think this is true, but does not help the psychological theorist generate an
account of the wrongness of using infants for sexual gratification.
15 Tooley’s account of desiring x requires conceptual understanding of x, and it is implausible that infants have such con-
ceptual understanding. Of course, it might be that they have latent second-order desires against being used sexually, but
the admission of latent second-order desires would only serve to prohibit abortion and infanticide similarly.
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Lest this seem uncharitable, we note that this implication is borne out by the
recent case of Anna Stubblefield, who was convicted of aggravated sexual assault
on a 29-year-old man with severe cerebral palsy and sentenced to 12 years imprison-
ment.16 While McMahan and Singer (2017) objected primarily to the judgment on
empirical grounds, they offer a comment in passing on the sexual rights the victim
would have if he were, in fact, too cognitively impaired to consent: ‘it makes it
less clear what the nature of the wrong might be… if Stubblefield wronged or
harmed him, it must have been in a way that he is incapable of understanding
and that affected his experience only pleasurably’. It is similarly unclear what the
nature of the wrong might be in cases of infants used in analogous circumstances.
This is a strong mark against psychological theories of value and rights.
There are, of course, good utilitarian reasons why such behaviour with infants
should be prohibited. It would be difficult to guarantee that infants were not phys-
ically harmed, and it may encourage some adults to abuse older children. While
these reasons might indeed be powerful, and of course, defenders of psychological
accounts do not, in fact, endorse sexual activity with infants, it is difficult to see
how this prohibition is implied by their theories. For the problem with such justifi-
cations is that most people would recoil at the idea that there are only instrumental
reasons for the prohibition on sexual activity with infants: the heinousness of sexual
activity with infants is surely something intrinsic to the action itself – not merely a
pragmatic concern.
Pre-personal discrimination
Our final example concerns pre-personal discrimination. We ordinarily think it is
wrong to harm or kill those who are ‘one of us’ – persons, humans, or members
of the moral or human community. We think that it is especially wrong to do so
on the grounds of that person’s skin colour, sex or sexual orientation (whether or
not these constitute a separate harm or merely aggravate the initial harm need not
detain us here). But most of us are agree that such protected characteristics apply
only to us, and not to pebbles, crocuses or mosquitoes. It is not racist to selectively
destroy beige pebbles on a beach (because one prefers the other colours aestheti-
cally), and it is not sexist to selectively kill female mosquitoes (for example, to
help stop the spread of malaria).
We suggest that human infants are more similar in kind to human adults than
pebbles and mosquitoes in this respect. It would be wrong to selectively destroy
black infants because one prefers white infants aesthetically, just as it would be
wrong to selectively destroy female infants for the same reason (or to help prevent
the spread of Duchenne muscular dystrophy). Or, supposing we could tell from
an early stage whether a child was likely to be same-sex attracted or not, it would
be wrong to kill an infant on those grounds (this need not result directly from antip-
athy towards same-sex attracted people: one might have only the resources to raise
one child, and yet strongly desire grandchildren, in a country where same-sex
attracted adults were banned from adopting). The killing of infants because of
16 The conviction has been overturned on appeal and a retrial has been ordered.
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their skin colour, sex or sexual orientation, we suggest, would strike most people as
heinous – and rightly so, we think.
But why? If infants are one of us, and part of our moral and human community, we
can rule out suchkillings on the same grounds.The exact reason racism iswrongmaybe
disputed, butmanyhave thought itwrongon the grounds that it is our commonhuman-
ity that grounds our human rights, such that discriminatory treatment on the grounds of
protected characteristics attacks the human dignity of the victims. This sort of account
accommodates the intuition against the discriminatory killing of infants quite readily.
And yet the psychological accounts do not. For there is no general prohibition on
discrimination on the grounds of colour or sex, as we saw earlier. Such prohibitions
apply only among members of the human moral community. But the psychological
accounts exclude infants and foetuses from the human moral community, making
them more like pebbles and mosquitoes in this respect. We suggest, therefore, that
the intuitive injunction against the discriminatory killing of infants undermines
the proposed psychological accounts of value and rights.
Again, we note that there is some precedent for this sort of pre-personal discrimi-
nation. For example, disabled foetuses can be aborted up to birth in the UK, while
there is otherwise a limit of 24 weeks. Yet discrimination against disabled adults is
prohibited by law. Similarly, recent cases of apparent sex-selective abortions being
offered led to UK MPs voting against a clarification in the law prohibiting sex-
selective abortion. Moreover, when a private prosecution was brought against a
doctor implicated in such a practice, the case was taken over by the Crown Prosecu-
tion Service (CPS) who subsequently dropped it as it was deemed to be ‘not in the
public interest’ (CPS, 2013). So it is not possible to dismiss this as a straw man impli-
cation of psychological accounts.
Discussion and conclusions
We have detailed these five scenarios as a reductio ad absurdum of psychological
accounts of value and rights. They each appeal to a strong moral intuition that
killing, harming or otherwise violating innocent human beings, including infants, is
wrong, and that the behaviours described in these scenarios constitute such violations.
Proponents of psychological accounts of personhood often (though not invari-
ably) share these intuitions, but argue that other intuitions pertaining to personhood
and value imply that a serious right to life requires certain actual – not potential –
psychological capacities. This entails the permissibility of abortion, but since
infants, like foetuses, lack the relevant psychological capacities, they also lack a
right to life. Moreover, given the tenuous psychological continuity between infants
and the future person they may become (may, because the infant survives only in
our fourth scenario, and not necessarily so), that person will not be significantly
harmed by unremembered pre-personal acts on the infant. Consequently, psycho-
logical accounts prima facie imply the permissibility of our five scenarios, contrary
to our intuitions about their wrongness or heinousness.
Moral theories that violate our strong intuitions need to explain why these viola-
tions do not undermine their status as moral theories. As McMahan (2013b, p. 109)
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comments, ‘one might even wonder what claim a theory might have to be a moral
theory if it has foundations that are wholly independent of the intuitions that
have shaped the common features of all recognisably moral codes’.
There are two options for the defender of psychological accounts: to reject these
intuitions, or to explain why each of these scenarios is morally problematic. In the
former case, there is not much we can do other than to strengthen the intuitions
and defend them from undercutting defeaters. We take it that most people will
feel the force of these intuitions and not give them up lightly. Although there is a
strong intuition against infanticide which we have strengthened, we have also
detailed further scenarios against which there are even stronger intuitions, such
that the cost of giving them up is augmented. Of course, the cost must be weighed
against other intuitions in favour of psychological accounts. While we do not
have the time to respond to those other intuitions here, we note that they are not
without controversy. But our primary task here is shoring up the intuitions
against pre-personal harms and exhibiting the cost of rejecting them.
Some ethicists take up the latter challenge: for example, Feinberg discusses infan-
ticide as a potential reductio of his position on personhood, concluding that ‘infan-
ticide is wrong’ (1986, p. 210) despite infants not being persons. Feinberg explains
that kindness towards infants has social utility, and that ‘insofar as infanticide would
tend to weaken that socially valuable response, it is, on utilitarian grounds, morally
wrong’.
Other ethicists who also allow the permissibility of infanticide in very restricted
circumstances (e.g. for severely disabled infants) implicitly indicate that the impli-
cations are problematic. They go to considerable lengths to justify the restriction
on circumstances and emphasise that they do not think that infanticide is generally
permissible. For example, Kuhse and Singer (1985) allow infanticide on the basis
that some infants are unlikely to be able to live a worthwhile life, and they are con-
cerned about the impact on families of caring for a severely disabled infant. As pre-
viously noted, Singer and Wells strongly oppose our organ donation scenario,
describing it as ‘a prospect that almost everyone will find repellent’ (1984, p. 148).
McMahan (2013a) argues that as infants are more psychologically developed
than foetuses, according to his TRIA they are harmed to a greater extent by being
killed. Infanticide is also likely to ‘elicit more intense grief and guilt than abortion
typically does’, McMahan (page?) and the burden of caring for unwanted infants
can be met by the state in most instances.
Do these sorts of moves succeed? We think it unlikely. We have shown in this
paper that the implications of these accounts are more radical than their defenders
have frequently supposed. And this is increasingly recognised by those authors.
Hence, McMahan reluctantly concludes that infanticide of orphaned babies for
organ transplants may be permissible (or obligatory). He does not go on to
explain why babies unwanted by their parents might not also be utilised for the
same purpose (or more sinister but pleasurable purposes). Tooley (1988) has long
supported infanticide for a short period of time after birth, with apparently no
restrictions. And in recent years, we have seen that Giubilini and Minerva have
embraced the implications of their views, regarding infanticide as permissible for
any reason abortion is permissible.
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Singer and Feinberg are utilitarians, and it seems obvious that sacrificing
unwanted healthy infants (who are not persons) could benefit many existing
persons. Singer’s claims about the importance of society’s attitude of care and pro-
tection of infants are not convincing, especially since this does not seem to be a con-
sideration when it comes to abortion, as Oderberg and Laing note (1997). Feinberg
is subject to the same criticism about the value of kindness towards infants.
So the task is notmerely to explain why these scenarios involve moral wrongdoing.
It is to explain, firstly, why they involve wrongdoing in ways that, for example, abor-
tion does not. Secondly, since the intuitions here are not merely that the scenarios are
to be avoided but that they involve intrinsic wrongdoing, we need an explanation of
their intrinsic wrongdoing without reference to practical concerns that might easily
be outweighed. In particular, we need an explanation of their heinousness which,
as Berkich (2009) has credibly shown, requires (at least) reference to essential and sig-
nificant features of an action – features that are notmerely coincidentally present (e.g.
as common consequences), and features which set a minimum bound of heinousness
for every instance of such an act. Explanations appealing only to contingent features,
or which allow for these actions to be only negligibly wrong insofar as other wrong-
making characteristics are absent, will not suffice.
In the absence of such accounts, we conclude that our overall reductio succeeds.
That is, psychological accounts of personhood do at present suggest the permissibil-
ity of infanticide, even for healthy infants. These accounts also imply the permissi-
bility of pre-personal acts such as forced organ donation, use of infants for
medical research, use of infants for sexual gratification, and discrimination
against infants. It is difficult to see how these implications can be escaped.
We suggest that infanticide and these other pre-personal acts are morally heinous
and that this judgment is rightly widely shared. Insofar as this is the case, the credi-
bility of psychological accounts is thereby diminished in proportion to the strength
of the intuitions against such acts. And for most people, we suggest, such intuitions
have considerable force. But if all this is true, it has significant implications for abor-
tion ethics. As we noted in the introduction, many contemporary defences of abor-
tion depend on denying foetuses (and often infants) the status of personhood on the
basis of psychological accounts of rights, value and personhood. If, as we suggest,
those accounts are made implausible by the reductios described above, defenders
of the permissibility of abortion will have to appeal to alternative arguments.
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